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Introduction
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence is, according to Nietzsche “Das 
grösste Schwergewicht” -  the heaviest burden, the greatest weight, the greatest 
stress.1 The burden is, however, a paradoxical one, for it is a burden which 
liberates those few who are able to bear it. The eternal recurrence of the same, 
the most terrifying of thoughts when viewed by one who lacks the strength to 
think it as his own, becomes the most liberating of thoughts for those who 
make it their own, for it opens up to them the path to complete affirmation 
of both self and world. That which is a threat to the nay-sayers to life becomes 
in Nietzsche's eyes a joyous thought for those who have said “yes' to life.2 
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is in this sense for Nietzsche 
a way of interpreting existence, a thought experiment,3 which opens up the 
possibility of a total affirmation of life in the moment.
If the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is interpreted in this 
fashion, its existential significance comes to the fore and we see the question 
to which it is a possible answer. How, Nietzsche is asking, is it possible to 
affirm life completely? His answer is: by thinking and willing life as an 
eternal recurrence of the same. Although this is by no means the only 
possible interpretation of the significance of the doctrine of the eternal re­
1 Friedrich N ietzsche, Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe herausgegeben von G iorgio Colli 
und M azzino M ontinari (Berlin: W alter de Gruyter Verlag, 1973), Fünfte Abteilung, 
Zweiter Band, p. 2 5 0  — The Gay Science, translated by W alter Kaufmann, IV, § 341, 
pp. 2 7 3 -7 4 . Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the German edition of N ietz ­
sche's works w ill be to the Colli and M ontinari critical edition, cited according to section 
and volum e, manuscript number for the notebooks, and then page number.
2 Werke, V /2 , p. 201 — The Gay Science, IV, § 276 , p. 223: “someday I w ish to be only 
a Yes-sayer!”
3 Werke, V /2 , pp. 2 3 0 -3 1  =  The Gay Science, IV, § 319, p. 253: “. . .  we, w e others w ho  
thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific 
experim ent -  hour after hour, day after day. W e  ourselves w ish to be our experiments 
and guinea pigs.”
currence of the same in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and although I do not by any 
means think that this interpretation exhausts the range of philosophical 
problems raised by a consideration of the problem of the eternal recurrence 
of the same in its own right, I do think that situating the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same within the context of this question leads to a 
clear understanding of the issues at stake in Nietzsche’s defense of this doc­
trine and offers a framework within which the adequacy of the doctrine can 
be judged; moreover, as I shall show below, such an interpretation has ample 
textual justification.
Thus the question which will form the focal point of our inquiry here is 
this: does thinking and willing life in terms of the eternal recurrence of the 
same bring about the complete affirmation of life that Nietzsche claims for it? 
In the following remarks, I shall first develop and substantiate this approach 
to the problem of the eternal recurrence of the same in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
and then turn to an inquiry into the adequacy of Nietzsche’s position by 
developing a Kierkegaardian critique of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
of the same. The purpose of such a critique is not that of presenting a 
“refutation” of Nietzsche’s position through arguments drawn from Kierke­
gaard, but rather that of developing more fully the dimensions of a philo­
sophical problem common to both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: the problem 
of the limits of self-affirmation in light of the necessary temporality of human 
existence.
The Eternal Recurrence of the Same
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is introduced in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra specifically within the context of the question of the in­
accessibility of the past to the creative will and the consequent restriction 
which this imposes upon the possibility of genuine redemption. Zarathustra 
speaks to his disciples in the following terms:
“To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into 
a ‘thus I willed it’ -  that alone I should call redemption. Will -  that is 
the name of the liberator and joy-bringer; thus I taught you, my friends. 
But now learn this too: the will itself is still a prisoner. Willing liberates; 
but what is it that puts the liberator himself in fetters? ‘It was’ -  that is 
the name of the will’s gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. 
Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that
is past. The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot beak time and 
times covetousness, that is the will’s loneliest melancholy.4 
Redemption is an Erlösung -  a loosening or untieing (Lösung) from that 
which binds. The past, however, binds us, chains the creative will in the 
present while remaining inaccessible to that will. Frustrated by its inability 
to change the past and thereby become completely free in the present moment, 
the creative will takes its revenge by venting its wrath in the present: “.. .  on 
all who can suffer he [the liberator, the creative will] wreaks revenge for his 
inability to go backwards.”5 We then call this revenge “punishment,” thereby 
attempting to justify it, to create a good conscience by means of a hypo­
critical lie. The lie is eventually raised to the level of a general view of life 
itself in which the creative will comes to see its own creativity as a punish­
ment justified by the law of time itself; redemption thereby comes to be seen 
as incompatible with willing creatively.
All of this, Zarathustra declares, is the fable of madness, even if such 
madness passes as conventional wisdom. Revenge, disguising itself as punish­
ment, can never annihilate the deed which has sunk into the past. The attempt 
to do so merely places one more deed in the irretrievable past which cannot 
be annihilated. Existence becomes a circulus vitiosus of deed, guilt and 
revenge. Against this, Zarathustra holds out the possibility of creatively 
willing the past. Thus he preaches a new message to his disciples.
“I led you away from these fables when I taught you, ‘The will is a 
creator.’ All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident -  until the 
creative will says to it, ‘But thus I willed it.’ Until the creative will says 
to it, ‘But thus I will; thus shall I will it’.”6 
Although he is willing to admit that no creative will has yet been able to 
affirm the past in such a manner, Zarathustra maintains that such an act is 
within the reach of the will to power -  indeed, Zarathustra himself may have
4  Werke, V I/1 , pp. 1 7 5 -1 7 6  =  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by W alter Kaufmann 
N ew  York: The V ik ing Press, 1966), II, “On R edem ption,” p. 139.
5 Ibid., p. 176 =  ibid., p. 140.
6 Ibid., p. 177 =  ibid., p. 141.
reached this level.7 Thus complete redemption is open to the creative will 
insofar as it is able to have willed the “it was” in the past, to be willing it in 
the present, and to continue to will it in the future.
There is, however, an ambiguity in this formulation which is rooted in the 
vagueness of the term “it was,” and this ambiguity gives rise to two possible 
interpretations of the idea of creatively willing the “it was.” First, it is possible 
to maintain that Zarathustra is advocating here an affirmation of the facticity 
of ones personal history as the necessary context within which creative willing 
must occur and simultaneously maintaining that only through creative willing 
is this facticity of personal history made meaningful, i. e. constituted as my 
history. In this case, the “it was” would refer to those prior events which 
constitute the personal history of the willing subject. Once they are willed -  
in the past, present, and future -  they are appropriated by him as his own, 
thereby ceasing to be fragmentary, accidental. They are brought under the 
unity of a single, willing subject who recognizes himself as their author.
The second possible interpretation would broaden the extension of the “it 
was” to include all prior events as such, not merely those which immediately 
constitute the personal history of the willing subject. In this case, the creative 
willing which Zarathustra recommends would not be limited to an appropria­
tion of one’s personal history, but would extend to history as such -  indeed, 
it would be cosmic in scale.
These two interpretations are rooted in the two different extensions of the 
term “it was,” but they are not mutually exclusive in principle; rather, the 
first is a more limited version of the second. If the second is possible, then the 
first will also be possible. In itself, the impossibility of the second does not 
exclude the possibility of the first kind of willing of the “it was.” If, however, 
the first necessarily entails the second, then the first is possible if and only 
if the second kind of willing of the “it was” is possible.
These two senses of creatively willing the “it was” are inextricably inter-
7 The problem  of indirect communication, especially in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is almost 
as great as it is in  the works of Kierkegaard. A t the end of this passage, the drawf asks 
Zarathustra why he speaks otherwise to his pupils than to him self, and Zarathustra does 
not refute the charge. H ow  is this to be interpreted? D oes it refer to all or only a specific 
part of Zarathustras speech? Because it is not refuted, is it thereby to be taken as true? 
Since there is independent textual evidence to support N ietzsche’s adherence to the 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence, I have interpreted the question as referring to the 
issue o f  whether everyone has been able to w ill the eternal recurrence.
twined in Nietzsche’s thought and give rise to the two distinct levels on which 
he advanced the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same: (1) on the 
level of personal existence, and (2) in relation to the cosmos as a whole. For 
the purpose of the following discussion, I shall refer to the first level as the 
existential doctrine of the eternal recurrence and the second level as the 
cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence. I shall now examine the doctrine 
on each of these two levels, in each case focusing the discussion around a 
single passage which will serve as a locus classicus of the statement of the 
doctrine on that level. Then I shall show why the existential doctrine 
necessarily entails the cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same 
for Nietzsche. Once this foundation has been established, I shall then turn 
to the Kierkegaardian critique of Nietzsches position.
The existential doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. Although the 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence appears again in Zarathustraf* I would like 
to consider an earlier passage in The Gay Science which contains many of the 
elements of the description in Zarathustra without involving us in the dif­
ficulties of interpretation which spring from the poetic character of the latter 
work. Even in The Gay Science, Nietzsche does not present the eternal re­
currence as a literal truth, but rather poses it as a question to the reader. The 
context suggests that Nietzsche sees the importance of the doctrine to be 
located in the questions that it raises about the value of each moment of the 
individual’s life — specifically, about whether he is willing to affirm each and 
every moment of his own life in an unconditional fashion. The passage reads 
as follows.
The greatest weight. What, if some day or night a demon were to steal 
after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you 
now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and in­
numerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain 
and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably 
small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequence -  even this spider and this moonlight between the 
trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of 
existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speak 
of dust!”
Kierkegaardiana XI 7
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse 
the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: “You are a god and never 
have I heard anything more divine.” If this thought gained possession of 
you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question 
in each and every thing, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable 
times more?” would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how 
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave 
nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?9 
Thus the existential significance of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of 
the same emerges clearly from this passage: the demon’s message is the 
occasion for asking ourselves whether we are willing to affirm ourselves un­
conditionally in each moment, to give each moment “this ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal.” This affirmation of the moment in its eternal validity 
is two-fold: (1) an affirmation of self, specifically of self as creative will, and 
(2) an affirmation of life, specifically of the facticity out of which this self 
creates itself, of the self’s world. Viewed in this manner, the existential doc­
trine of the eternal occurence of the same stands in sharp juxtaposition to all 
doctrines which would negate self or world. In particular, it would be directed 
against the Christian moral interpretation of the world and any metaphysical 
expressions thereof, for these create an “other world” which negates the 
moment and the value of “this world” and thereby paves the way for the 
emergence of nihilism. The question of the eternal recurrence of the same 
leads to the question of the radical affirmation of the Diesseits of both self 
and world, the question of whether we are willing to choose and affirm our­
selves absolutely in the moment.
Interpreted in this fashion, the existential doctrine -  more precisely, the 
question -  of the eternal recurrence of the same does not involve any onto­
logical commitment to the nature of the cosmos as such, but is rather an 
instance of indirect communication intended to raise the existential question 
of whether we are willing to affirm absolutely both ourselves and the world 
in the moment. As such, it leads us to the further question: granted that we 
are willing to affirm both ourselves and our world absolutely in the moment, 
it is possible to do so? What would be the necessary conditions of the pos­
sibility of such an act of absolute affirmation of self and world? This question 
brings us back to the issue raised in Zarathustra: as long as the past remains 
inaccessible to the creative will and yet affects the present, is it possible to 
affirm the present moment absolutely? Must not only this moment, but all 
moments be affirmed absolutely? In his final notebooks, Nietzsche gives us 
a clue to the transition from the existential to the cosmic doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same.
A certain emperor always bore in mind the transitoriness of all things 
so as not to take them too seriously and to live at peace among them. To 
me, on the contrary, everything seems far too valuable to be so fleeting: 
I seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious 
salves and wines into the sea? -  My consolation is that everything that has 
been eternal: the sea will cast it up again.10 
In Nietzsche’s eyes, the necessary condition of the possibility of an absolute 
affirmation of the moment (as encompassing both self and world) is that 
every moment be given an ultimate confirmation and seal. He seeks to give 
an eternity to all moments through his cosmic doctrine of the eternal recur­
rence of the same, the affirmation of which is a necessary condition of the 
affirmation of any given moment.
The cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. Nietzsche’s 
presentation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence at this level is somewhat 
tentative in that most of the discussions of it are confined to his notebooks, 
where it is advanced as an alternative both to mechanistic world-views and 
to religious doctrines of creation and teleology. Nevertheless, judging from 
several outlines of a projected major work and from the content of the pas­
sages in which the doctrine is discussed, one can be rather certain that he 
attached great importance to it in his final years. In a notebook entry entitled 
“The New World-conception,” Nietzsche presents his clearest statement of 
the doctrine and its proof. He argues as follows.
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force 
and as a certain definite number of centers of force -  and every other 
representation remains indefinite and therefore useless -  it follows that, in 
the great dice game of its existence, it must pass through a calculable 
number of combinations. In definite time, every possible combination would
at some time or another be realized once; still more: it would be realized 
an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its 
next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to have taken 
place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of 
combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical 
series would thus be demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that 
has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game m 
infinitum}1
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence is no longer presented in the poetic 
form of one of Zarathustra’s sermons or as a question posed by a demon. 
Granting its subjunctive mood and the fact that it is found in the notebooks 
rather than in the works Nietzsche was able to publish himself, we must 
nonetheless admit that the doctrine is now asserted here in a fundamentally 
different manner than in the previous occurrences. It is now advanced as an 
explanation of the cosmos as such, laying claim to as much validity as is pos­
sible for any such theory within Nietzsche's perspective. It is no longer a 
question of the appropriation of the events which constitute an individual's 
past history, but an absolute affirmation of all events. Thus the affirmation 
of the cosmic doctrine entails the affirmation of the broader extension of the 
“it was” discussed above.
In approaching the cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence in this fashion,
I have tried to sketch out a plausible explanation of how Nietzsche moved 
from the attempt to fully affirm the moment to the cosmic doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same. The move from the existential to the cosmic 
version of the doctrine can, of course, be explained in terms of Nietzsche's 
concept of the will to power. The doctrine of the will to power commits 
Nietzsche to the necessary interconnectedness of all events: every instance of 
the will to power, every quantum of force, is necessarily related to all other 
quanta force.I 12 Insofar as this is the case, all moments are interrelated; so, too, 
are all events. Yet if all moments are interrelated and interdependent, then 
an absolute affirmation of one moment must include an affirmation of all 
moments; similarly, an absolute affirmation of the events of one's personal
I I  Werke, VII1/3 14 (1 8 8 ), p. 168 =  The W ill to Power, translated by W alter Kaufmann 
and R. J. H ollingdale (N ew  York: Random House, 1967), § 549. (Changes made in  
Kaufmann’s translation.)
12 Werke, V III/2, 10 (1 3 8 ), p. 2 0 1 -0 2  =  The W ill to Power, § 6 3 9 , p. 341.
history entails an affirmation of all prior events (i. e., of the broader extension 
of the “it was”). Consequently, given the premises of Nietzsches position 
(i. e. his notion of the will to power), his attempt to give an ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal to the moment necessarily leads him to assert the cos­
mic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same.
The cosmic doctrine is not, however, advanced as a realists thesis about the 
world as such. Any attempt to interpret it in this fashion clearly ignores 
Nietzsche’s own views on knowing, thinking and willing. Moreover, although 
the “proof” given in the notebook passage cited above is clearly fallacious,13 
the significance of the doctrine is not primarily dependent on the validity of 
that proof. An adequate exposition of Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge would 
take us far beyond the confines of this paper, but in should be noted that 
naming, the creation of meaning, thinking, and willing are all instances of 
the will to power.14 The cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same 
is not something which Nietzsche is claiming to have discovered about the 
world, but a form or structure he is choosing to impose upon existence through 
the exercise of the will to power. “All meaning is will to power.”15 In this 
sense, the assertion of the cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence is a 
creative act, an attempt to impose the character of being upon the world of 
becoming.16 However, the cosmic doctrine is not merely a thought-experiment 
-  life itself is the experiment whose question is how far such truth can be 
embodied.17 Thus the central question for Nietzsche is not one of the “objective 
truth” of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same, but rather a 
question of whether we can -  in thought as well as in action -  impose the 
cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same on existence. We then 
return to the existential level and attempt to make the cosmic doctrine true 
by embodying it.
13 Cf. Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche: Em Vortragszyklus (Leipzig: Duncker 
und H um blot, 1907), pp. 250  ff.; M ilic Capek, “T he Theory of the Eternal Recurrence 
in M odern Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy, LVII, 9 (April, I9 6 0 ), pp. 2 8 9 -9 5 .
14 See, for example, the fragments collected in The Will to Power, Book III, I: The W ill  
to Power as K nowledge, §§ 4 6 6 -6 1 7 , pp. 2 6 1 -3 3 1 .
15 Werke, V III/1, 2 (7 7 ), p. 95 =  The Will to Power, § 590, p. 323.
16 Werke, V III/1, 7 (54 ), p. 320 =  The W ill to Power, § 6 1 7 , p. 330: “T o im pose upon
becom ing the character o f being -  that is the supreme w ill to p o w er----- That everything
recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being: -  high  
point o f the m editation.”
17 Werke, N il, p. 149 =  The Gay Science, III, § 110, p. 171: “T o what extent can truth 
endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the experim ent.” A lso  see § 372.
The Problem. The circle is now complete. We have seen the way in which 
the existential doctrine of the eternal recurrence, given Nietzsche’s theory of 
the will to power, entails the cosmic doctrine; moreover, we now see the way 
in which the cosmic doctrine, given Nietzsche’s view of knowing as a creative 
act of the will to power, brings us back to the existential level; thus the eternal 
recurrence of the same must be embodied, lived out in some way. If the inter­
pretation given above of “The Greatest Weight” in The Gay Science is indeed 
sound, then the problem which gives rise to the doctrine of the eternal re­
currence is the question of how it is possible to affirm one’s actions completely 
and to affirm “life” absolutely. If the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the 
same is to be judged adequate from Nietzsche’s own standpoint, it would have 
at least to allow, even if it does not necessarily entail such an affirmation. If, 
on the other hand, the willing of the eternal recurrence of the same precludes 
the possibility of the affirmation which it was originally intended to bring 
about, then it is clearly inadequate even within Nietzsche’s own perspective. 
I would now like to turn to an explicit consideration of the adequacy of 
Nietzsche’s doctrine by discussing it in light of Kierkegaard’s views on the 
constitution of the self and the problem of temporality. The purpose of such 
a consideration is not to show that Nietzsche’s position does not meet Kierke­
gaard’s criteria, but rather to raise the question, by means of Kierkegaard’s 
arguments, of whether Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence offers 
an adequate solution to Nietzsche’s own problem.
The Kierkegaardian Critique
The problem of the absolute affirmation of the self and temporality 
dominates many of Kierkegaard’s works, especially those concerned with the 
aesthetic and ethical modes of existence. In the course of developing this 
problem, Kierkegaard raises a number of questions which are of especial 
importance in attempting an evaluation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence. In the following comments, I shall develop Kierkegaard’s analysis 
of the problem of temporality and the absolute affirmation of the self through 
the three primary modes of the existence -  the aesthetic, the ethical, and the 
religious -  and show the way in which Kierkegaard’s analysis of the problem 
raises serious difficulties about the tenability of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same.
Temporality and Aesthetic Existence. The question which dominates
EitherjOr, especially the first volume, is this: what are the consequences of 
attempting to affirm human existence purely as aesthetic? In Kierkegaard's 
eyes, it is clear that “a single, coherent, aesthetic view of life can scarcely be 
carried out."18 The attempt to do so inevitably leads to contradictions 
culminating in the dissolution of the self. The following analysis of these 
contradictions will show the impossibility of maintaining the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same on the level of aesthetic existence, of attempting 
to say “yes" to life as purely aesthetic existence. The aesthete inevitably en­
counters the problem of the “it was," and it becomes its most secret melancholy 
which it cannot overcome. Let us consider this in relation to the three basic 
attempts to affirm existence as aesthetic which are presented in EitherjOr: 
Don Juan, the reflective seducer, and “A," the pseudonymous author of most 
of the first volume. Don Juan and the reflective seducer are, respectively, the 
ideal terminus a quo and terminus ad quern of the concrete aesthetic existence 
which A himself attempts to live out.19
Don Juan is the artistic representation of pure sensuousness, and as such 
he is possible only as art -  indeed, as non-representational art, for Don Juan 
is fundamentally musical. Any attempt to translate the story of Don Juan 
into conventional dramatic form makes Don Juan into a comic figure; only 
Mozart's opera has captured his true essence as absolutely musical. In stressing 
the absolutely musical character of Don Juan, Kierkegaard wants to stress 
the way in which pure sensuousneses, even in its artistic representation, is 
inaccessible to reflective thought. The figure of Don Juan is in many respects 
similar to Nietzsche’s Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy. Both Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard recognize that it is in music that the principle of individuation 
is overcome most completely. The contrast between Dionysos and Apollo is 
the contrast between immediate sensuousness and reflective thought -  a 
tension which Nietzsche saw to be at the heart of Greek tragedy. Moreover, 
just as there is an abyss lurking behind the artistic representation of Don Juan, 
so, too, in Nietzsche we find the threat of nothingness lurking behind the 
serenity of Greek thought, behind its alleged equilibrium. Finally, both Don 
Juan and Dionysos are thoroughly immersed in a world of becoming to such
18 Sdren Kierkegaard, Either ¡Or, translated by D avid F. Swenson and Lillian M arvin Swen­
son, V olum e O ne (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 13.
19 Cf. Louis Mackey, “The Poetry o f Inwardness” in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, edited by Josiah Thom pson (Garden City, N ew  York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 24.
an extent that it is almost impossible to speak of individual actions in 
either case.
The problem of the eternal recurrence of the same also arises for Don Juan. 
As one who desires sensuousness pure and simple, he exists purely in the 
moment. To see a woman is for him to love her: “it is in the moment, in the 
same moment everything is over, and the same thing repeats itself endlessly.”20 
Indeed, the sameness here refers to both self and world: being totally at one 
with the moment, there is no element of difference introduced into either 
Don Juan himself or his world. This is why Don Juan is essentially faithless, 
both to himself and to the world except insofar as these exist purely in the 
moment. However, the consequence of this is that neither self nor world 
possesses a history; both consequently lack any continuity -  indeed, neither 
are constituted as such. (In a similar manner, there is no history for Dionysos, 
only an immersion without end in the primordial contradiction of existence.) 
Thus for Kierkegaard, a complete affirmation of the moment as pure sensu­
ousness on an artistic level results in an eternal recurrence of the same, but 
this sameness -  pure sensuousness -  excludes the possibility of the constitution 
of either self or world. On this level, pure sensuousness does not contain the 
moment of difference -  first posited through the distinction between self and 
world -  necessary for the constitution of the self and of the world.
There is, of course, an additional argument against the possibility of such 
an existence: Don Juan is possible only as art. His is an impossible project 
which cannot be lived out, but only represented musically. The world itself 
is not so constituted as to offer immediate gratification of one's desires. More­
over, if it were so constituted, Don Juan would encounter another problem -  
boredom. As an artistic creation, Don Juan escapes this problem, but it be­
comes a serious one for one who attempts to live out the aesthetic choise, as 
we shall see below in our consideration of “A.”
The affirmation of aesthetic existence on the level of art thus involves an 
affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same, an endless return of the 
sensuous as such. On the artistic level, the same moment repeats itself end­
lessly. Such an affirmation is, however, only possible as art -  it cannot be lived 
out. Thus the affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same on the 
artistic level in this sense is an affirmation which does not meet Nietzsche's
20  EitherlOr, I, p. 93.
own standards insofar as his doctrine of the eternal recurrence was clearly 
one which was to be lived out.
It is in the figure of the reflective seducer that we find the clearest instance 
of an attempt to live out the aesthetic mode of existence to its final conclusion. 
“The Diary of a Seducer” in Either ¡Or records the reflective seducers progress 
in capturing, not a womans body, but her spirit. It becomes evident that his 
craft consists of self-concealment and self-denial -  indeed, he sees his task to 
be such that he must transform his appearance into whatever will be the 
most effective in terms of his goal of seduction. He becomes a poseur obsessed 
with his own skill in maintaining the appropriate mask. However, the re­
flective seducer is also caught in a contradiction. Throughout the process of 
seduction, he must deny himself and thereby his own immediacy -  he must 
live in service of the idea.21 But in the moment in which the seduction is 
completed, he finds himself at a loss -  the moment of fulfillment is the 
moment at which the relationship must be terminated.22 He desires to seduce 
the free spirit of another, but the moment in which the seduction is successful 
that spirit is no longer free and thus no longer capable of giving that which 
was sought. The attempt to live out the choise of the reflective seducer leads 
inevitably to the dissolution of the self, for even the moment of self-fulfillment 
is destroyed in its very achievement. He is involved in a never-ending circle 
from which he cannot escape,23 a circle in which he continually moves from 
self-denial to a fulfillment which destroys itself in the moment.
The reflective seducer illustrates the difficulties encountered in any attempt 
to live out to its final consequences an affirmation of the aesthetic mode of 
existence. The prefatory comments to the “Diary,” A’s comments on a diary 
which may actually be his own,24 reveal that A is indeed repulsed by this 
vision of the ultimate possibility of his own existence. In one sense, it matters 
little whether A is actually the author of the diary; it is sufficient that he 
could have been, that this is his ultimate destiny. The reflective seducer is the 
final outcome of the aesthetic man’s attempt to affirm the moment. In order 
to see more clearly the problems lurking behind the facade of the reflective
21 Ibid., p. 432.
22 Ibid., p. 439.
23 Ibid., pp. 3 0 4 -0 5 .
24  Ibid., p. 13.
seducer’s existence, we must look more closely at the aesthetic man himself, 
A, and specifically at the method he uses for affirming his existence.
The aesthetic man, A, wants to live fully in the moment, but the attempt 
to affirm the moment completely leads him into a dilemma. That which stands 
in the way of a complete affirmation of the moment is any kind of commit­
ment, whether to the past, future or present. In order to live completely in 
the moment, it becomes necessary for him to sever any necessary connection 
with the past, including his own personal history. He must therefore bring 
remembering and forgetting under his own control, thereby breaking necessary 
identity with his own past. Not only must he distance himself from his own past, 
but he must also avoid immersing himself completely in anything in the present, 
since “enjoying an experience to its full intensity to the last minute will make 
it impossible either to remember or to forget.”25 Finally, he must also prevent 
himself from hoping, for if one hopes then one measures the moment in terms 
of some future goal, thereby devaluating the moment and seeing in it only 
that which contributes to the attainment of that future goal. This is indeed 
the paradoxical outcome of the aesthetic man’s attempt to affirm the moment 
absolutely: he distances himself not only from past and future, but must even 
distance himself from the moment itself, lest it gains too strong a hold on 
him. In this sense, the greatest threat to the aesthete’s existence is that he 
might encounter something or someone to which he becomes committed, for 
that would undermine his attempt to live in the moment.
The method which the aesthete employs in order to avoid this danger is 
described by A as the rotation method. It consists of cultivating the power 
of remembering and forgetting as one of the means of getting into “a position 
to play at battledore and shuttlecock with the whole of existence.”26 In A’s 
eyes, this makes possible the realization of a complete freedom, but that 
freedom is bought at the price of negating all commitment -  even to one’s 
self. One must constantly vary everything, not only external objects and one’s 
perspective on them but “one must also constantly vary himself.”27 The result 
of this is an affirmation of arbitrariness and chance: the self is affirmed as 
arbitrary, and the external world is viewed only under the category of the 
accidental. In his “Ecstatic Lecture,” A maintains that he sees everything
25 Ibid., p. 289.
26 Ibid., p. 290.
27 Ibid., p. 294.
aeterno modo, and indeed this is the result of his own affirmation of the 
moment: each moment is given an eternity, but in the process temporality 
as the continuity of moment is lost.
If the possibility of forming a commitment is the danger which constitutes 
one side of the aesthete’s dilemma, the rotation method is intended to guard 
not only against that but against the other horn of the dilemma: boredom. 
The constant variation achieved by means of the rotation method should 
overcome this boredom, but it is questionable whether this is in principle 
possible. Boredom, A maintains, “depends on the nothingness which pervades 
reality.”28 This is, in other words, the threat of nihilism, and the nothingness 
which we encounter here pervades both self and world. Its roots, however, 
are primarily in the self, for the aesthetic self is a nothing;29 consequently the 
world constituted by that self must be pervaded by nothingness. With the 
self as arbitrary and the world as accidental, reality becomes a series of discrete 
moments bearing no essential relation to one another, lacking any significant 
continuity. Thus the arbitrary and the accidental continually repeat them­
selves. In his lecture to the Symparanekromenoi on “The Unhappiest Man,” 
A concludes by telling his listeners to arise: “The night is spent, and the day 
begins its unwearied activities, never weary, it seems, of everlastingly repeating 
itself.”30
The rotation method functions for the aesthetic man in a manner which 
is quite similar to the way in which the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
of the same functions for Nietzsche. Both are attempts to think about and live 
out existence in such a way as to affirm the moment completely. Both involve 
giving an eternal seal and confirmation to every moment, living aeterno modo. 
The aesthetic man affirms everything in the world as accidental, and this 
indeed corresponds to Nietzsche’s own descriptions of the cosmos as an 
eternally recurring play of forces without any goal.31 Indeed, the aesthete 
plays with the whole of existence, as does Nietzsche’s free spirit. However, our 
consideration of the aesthete’s mode of existence raises a question not only 
of the aesthete but also of Nietzsche. If, in order to affirm the moment com­
pletely, one must deny any necessary temporal continuity to both self and
28 Ibid., p. 287.
29  Ibid., pp. 28  ff.
30 Ibid., p. 228.
31 Werke, V II/3, 38 (1 2 ), pp. 3 3 8 -3 9  =  The W ill to Power, § 1067, pp. 5 4 9 -5 0 .
world, then does not nothingness come to pervade reality? If one affirms 
ones self as arbitrary and the world as accidental, then existence (in which 
self and world come together) becomes meaningless, and this meaninglessness 
is the foundation of nihilism. Each moment becomes an eternity unto itself, 
and both self and world lack the continuity necessary for creating and 
sustaining meaning. Both the rotation method and the thinking and willing 
of the eternal recurrence of the same free us from the “it was,” but the price 
of such freedom is the continuity necessary for meaning to emerge.
Is, however, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same to 
be equated with the aesthete’s rotation method? Here two interpretations are 
open to us. If we followed the cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the 
same, we would be led to thinking that the eternal recurrence involved some 
form of determinism: if everything recurs eternally the same in the cosmos, 
then the individual is but a toy buffeted by the waves of this eternal play of 
forces. In a sense, this is what the aesthete turns himself into, for the aesthete, 
since he never chooses to become anything but rather simply to be, must 
continually react rather than act. However, in Nietzsche’s presentation of the 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence, this doctrine is one which the individual 
chooses to affirm, imposes upon existence. It is not meant as a descriptive 
statement, but rather as an existential category for the structuring of the 
individual’s experience and action. If we follow this interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence, then there appears to be a way out of this dilemma: 
through his choice to impose the structure of the eternal recurrence on 
existence, the individual thereby imposes a continuity which was beyond the 
reach of the aesthetic man. The aesthetic man refused -  almost resolutely -  
to choose himself, but in this interpretation of the eternal recurrence the 
individual would indeed be choosing himself. However, once the issue of 
choice is raised we enter the realm of the ethical for Kierkegaard.
Before turning to a consideration of the ethical, let us summarize the result 
of our discussion about the aesthetic. The case of the aesthetic man shows 
that a complete affirmation of the moment as such is only possible if the 
moment is severed from any essential connection with other moments past 
or future. If this is done, both self and world become discontinous, the self 
becoming arbitrary and the world accidental. If this is done, existence becomes 
meaningless, a mere series of discrete moments. Moreover, it even becomes 
necessary to distance oneself from each moment, lest one thereby becomes
so involved that forgetting is impossible. Clearly, this attempt to say “yes” 
completely to the moment is inadequate, for if lived out it leads to the dis­
solution of both self and world.
Temporality and Choice: Ethical Existence. The movement from the 
aesthetic to the ethical level is accomplished in the moment in which the 
individual chooses to become himself.32 For Judge Wilhelm, the pseudo­
nymous author of the second volume of Either ¡Or, this involves choosing 
oneself in ones eternal validity.33 345The ethical man affirms himself as choosings 
and as therefore responsible for his own actions. He thereby constitutes him­
self as historical, as having both a past and a future. He relates to that past 
under the category of repentance34 and to his future under the category of 
duty 35 The task of the ethical man is thus to become himself by permeating 
his concreteness with the universal.36 In this process, the aesthetic is taken up 
and transformed, for “in choosing itself the personality chooses itself ethically 
and excludes absolutely the aesthetic, but since he chooses himself and since 
he does not become another being by choosing himself but becomes himself, 
the whole of the aesthetic comes back again in its relativity.”37 If we look 
only at Judge Wilhelms description of the ethical life, it seems to offer an 
equilibrium in which the particular and the universal are indeed in harmony 
and in which both the moment and eternity are preserved. If Judge Wilhelm 
is to be believed, it seems to be within man's power to choose himself in his 
eternal validity.
There are, however, problems with the ethical life which the Judge is not 
willing to admit. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard -  as 
Johannes Climacus -  suggests that, “I think that the Judge, supposing I could 
get hold of him and whisper a little secret in his ear, will concede that there 
are difficulties he did not take into account.”38 Some of these difficulties had 
already been suggested in Fear and Trembling, where Kierkegaard -  as Jo­
hannes de silentio -  maintains that the individual's ethical task is “to abolish
32 Soren Kierkegaard, Either ¡Or, V olum e II, translated by W alter Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 17 0 -7 1 .
33 Ibid., p. 215.
34 Ibid., p. 229.
35 Ibid., pp. 256  ff.
36 Ibid., p. 260.
37 Ibid., p. 182.
38 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by D avid F. Swenson 
and W alter Lowrie (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 161.
his particularity in order to become the universal/’39 The argument in these 
works is that it is impossible to transform the aesthetic fully into the universal, 
that it is impossible to achieve the equilibrium which Judge Wilhelm claims 
to have attained. The argument is already presaged in the sermon of the 
Jutland parson which stands at the end of Either ¡Or. The argument here can 
be developed in several ways. First, it is impossible to permeate all of one’s 
particularity, one’s immediacy, with the universal. In the order of time, the 
immediacy precedes the self-choice and one can only reappropriate past im­
mediacy through repentance; but to do so is to acknowledge that it was not 
originally chosen. Second, the refuge of the practical ethical man -  Judge 
Wilhelm, for instance -  is that one does one’s best, one does what one can.40 
However, and this is the question raised by the Jutland pastor, can we ever 
be certain that we have done the best that we can? Moreover, even if we could 
be certain of that, how are we to deal with those cases in which the “best” 
was simply not enough? The hidden presupposition of the Judge’s view is 
that there is a pre-established harmony between the particular and the 
universal, between the aesthetic and the ethical, which is at least in principle 
attainable for man, but it is precisely this for which there is no guarantee, for 
only God is in a position to answer that question. Thus the ethical man, when 
pushed to the final consequences of his position, must maintain with the 
Jutland pastor that “as against God, we are always in the wrong,”41 or, in the 
language of Eear and Trembling, he must give himself over to infinite re­
signation, however, leaves the individual powerless to regain his own im­
mediacy: “...  by my own strength I am not able to get least of the things 
which belong to finiteness, for I am constantly using my strength to renounce 
everything.”42
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the dilemma of the ethical man raises anew the 
question of the “it was” which we encountered in Zarathustra and leads us 
into the heart of the problem of the eternal recurrence of the same. The 
problem here is simply this: given the larger extension of “it was,” the af­
firmation of the eternal recurrence of the same destroys the distinction 
between self and world. By affirming all “it was” as a “thus I willed it” and
39 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Sickness unto Death, translated by W alter  
Lowrie (Garden City, N ew  York: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 6 4 -6 5 .
40  Either ¡Or, II. pp. 3 4 3 -5 6 .
41 Ibid.
42 Fear and Trembling, p. 60.
“thus I will it,” one obliterates the distinction between those actions which 
I as an individual did in some significant sense choose to do, those actions 
of which I was the author, and all other events in the world. Without that 
distinction, there is no difference between self and world: if I will everything, 
then I am coextensive with the world itself. Indeed, this is why Nietzsche’s 
position can so easily turn into a determinism: the implied identity of self 
and world can lead just as easily to seeing the self as merely a partial 
manifestation of the world. The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same 
contains precisely this ambiguity: because it implies an identity of self and 
world, it can be either a doctrine of absolute freedom (reducing the world 
to the self) or one of absolute determinism (reducing the self to the world). 
Only with the introduction of an element of difference is it possible to avoid 
conflating self and world, but the introduction of difference would seem to 
exclude the possibility of affirming the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
of the same.
Would, however, Nietzsche shrink from these conclusions? Would he 
perhaps not only accept but indeed gladly affirm these consequences? There 
is much to be said in favor of this view. Nietzsche clearly rejects any tradi­
tional view of a substantial self,43 as well as any doctrine of the free will as 
a faculty.44 Moreover, he clearly questions whether we can have adequate 
knowledge of the antecedent conditions of our actions or of their subsequent 
effects.45 In addition to this, the doctrine of the necessary interconnectedness 
of all events as expressed in the will to power is itself open to a deterministic 
reading, for it becomes a matter of perspective which event is labelled 
“cause” and which “effect” -  indeed, such labels become meaningless for 
Nietzsche.46 Finally, Nietzsche’s comment about being an immoralist, about 
going beyond good and evil, indicate that he would indeed reject the ethical 
mode of existence, although he surely understood the ethical in a different 
way than Kierkegaard did in many respects. All of this would seem to indicate 
that Nietzsche might well accept the conflation of self and world as a con­
sequence of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same and maintain
43 Werke, V III/1, 2 (1 5 2 ), p. 139 =  The Will to Power, § 556, p. 302.
44  Werke, V /2 , p. 261 =  The Gay Science, V , § 345, p. 285; Werke, V I/3 , pp. 8 9 -9 0  =  
The Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by W alter  
Kaufmann (N ew  York: The V ik ing Press, 1954), 4 9 9 -5 0 0 .
45 Werke, V /2 , pp. 2 7 2 -7 5  =  The Gay Science, V , § 354, pp. 2 9 7 -3 0 0 .
46 Werke, VII1/3, 14 (9 8 ), pp. 6 6 -6 8  =  The W ill to Power, § 551, pp. 2 9 5 -9 7 .
that this is a higher stage of existence. There is, I would suggest, yet another 
level on which we can explore the meaning of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same -  a level which can be more fully explored if 
we first turn to a consideration of Kierkegaard’s solution to the contradictions 
of ethical existence.
The Knight of Faith and the Free Spirit. Kierkegaard did not exclude the 
possibility that there might indeed be a harmony between the universal and 
the particular, between man and nature and between man and God; but the 
thrust of his arguments, especially in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
is what we certainly can never know that such a harmony is possible. Such 
knowledge would only be possible if we were able to see the world from 
God’s point of view, but precisely this is impossible for an existing individual. 
Part of the presumptuousness of Hegelian philosophy is that it lays claim to 
a divine point of view which is in principle beyond the reach of man. Perhaps 
an ultimate reconciliation of these opposites is possible, but since we can never 
know that, and since our lives depend on it, we can only live in fear and 
trembling with the objective uncertainty about the ultimate meaning of our 
own existence. Thus the religious man lives in a paradoxical faith in which 
he believes that in God all things are possible, but confesses to his ignorance 
as to how they indeed are possible. The absurd becomes the primary category 
for the religious man’s encounter with reality.
Kierkegaard’s rejection of the possibility of objective knowledge on the 
level of religious existence is not, however, based solely on his arguments 
against a Hegelian Identitatsphilosophie. In the opening chapters of the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript he argues against the possibility of adequate 
historical knowledge of the truth of Christianity by maintaining that the 
nature of historical knowledge is such that it can never yield more than an 
approximation which is incommensurable with the infinite interest which the 
inquirer has in the object. The third main argument he advances centers 
around the impossibility of objective knowledge of an absolute subject. Since 
God is not an object but rather an absolute subject, the attempt to obtain 
objective knowledge of him is doomed to failure, for objective knowledge is 
only possible as knowledge of an object. All attempts which claim success in 
this realm have indeed only succeeded in turning God into something he is 
not -  into an object rather than a subject. To this we could add a fifth argu­
ment from Fear and Trembling: the nature of thought and language is such
that it can deal only in terms of the universal, but God as an absolute 
particular is above the universal and cannot be apprehended in terms of it. 
This argument can be viewed as a variation on the fourth argument.
The sixth and perhaps most important argument against the possibility of 
objective knowledge in the religious sphere of existence centers around Kier­
kegaard’s doctrine of truth as subjectivity. Briefly, he maintains that the quest 
for objectivity always leads away from the subject and thus culminates in a 
denial of the importance of subjectivity.
The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby 
transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. Away 
from the subject the objective way of reflection leads to the objective truth, 
and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also 
becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity; 
for all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity. The way of 
objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical 
knowledge of different kinds; and always it leads away from the subject, 
whose existence or non-existence, and from the objective point of view 
quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent. Quite rightly, since as Hamlet 
says, existence and non-existence have only subjective significance. At its 
maximum this way will arrive at a contradiction, and insofar as the subject 
does not become wholly indifferent to himself, this merely constitutes a 
sign that his objective striving is not objective enough. At its maximum 
this way will lead to the contradiction that only the objective has come into 
being, while the subjective has gone out; that is to say, the existing in­
dividual has vanished, in that it has made an attempt to become what in 
the abstract sense is called subjectivity, the mere abstract form of an abstract 
objectivity. And yet, the objectivity which has thus come into being is, 
from the subjective point of view at the most, either an hypothesis or an 
approximation, because all eternal decisiveness is rooted in subjectivity.47 
Insofar as it necessarily leads away from the subject and makes that subject 
inessential, and insofar as it is the case that Christianity necessarily involves 
a decisive commitment on the part of the subject, the quest for objective 
knowledge in relation to Christianity will always lead away from Christianity 
for it leads away from the subject as such, away from the existing individual.
47 Concluding Unscientific Postspript, p .173.
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This turn toward truth as subjectivity entails a number of consequences 
for Kierkegaards position which are of direct relevance to our enquiry. These 
center around Kierkegaard’s definition of the relationship of the man of faith 
to God. It is, as his discussion of the knight of faith illustrates, an absolute 
relation between the individual and God. The individual is thereby isolated 
from all that which surrounds him, even other men of faith.48 The world 
historical becomes inessential to this relation.49 Language and thought are 
unable to deal with this relation adequately.50 Indeed, despite Kierkegaard’s 
protestations to the contrary, even the world itself is lost and he falls into 
acosmism.51 The sole criterion governing this relation is that of passion, of 
inwardness. The task of life is to become subjective to the highest possible 
degree, to achieve the maximum of inwardness. Thus Kierkegaard contrasts 
two cases:
If one who lives in the midst of Christendom goes up to the house of God, 
the house of the true God, with the true conception of God in his know­
ledge, and prays, but prays in a false spirit; and one who lives in an 
idolatrous community prays with the entire passion of the infinite, although 
his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is there most truth? The 
one prays in truth to God though he worships an idol; the other prays 
falsely to the true God, and hence worships in fact an idol.52 
The essential aspect of religious existence is not that of the “objective truth” 
of the one who is worshipped, but rather of the degree of inwardness on the 
part of the worshipper. Without this passion of inwardness, the true God is 
turned into an idol; with it, whoever is worshipped is thereby transformed 
into the true God if the act of worship involves the entire passion of the 
infinite.
Kierkegaard’s attacks on attempt to establish the objective truth of 
Christianity are thus founded on his notion of truth as subjectivity. The point 
of those attacks is to increase the objective uncertainty about Christianity 
precisely in order to bring about an increase in subjectivity, inwardness, by
48  Fear and Trembling, pp. 9 0 -9 1 .
49  Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 2 5 -4 7 .
50 Fear and Trembling, pp. 91 -1 2 9 -
51 See Louis Mackey, “The Loss o f the W orld in Kierkegaard’s Ethics,” Kierkegaard: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 2 6 6 -8 8 .
52 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 1 7 9 -8 0 .
increasing the tension between the finite and the infinite -  by increasing 
“that true hypertension of the infinite in the spirit of man“ which is already 
present in genuine ethical consciousness.53 However, we now appear to have 
come full circle in our investigation, for what Kierkegaard is saying here is 
that the affirmation of the paradox of Christianity with the entire passion of 
the infinite in faith is das grösste Schwergewicht -  the greatest stress, the 
heaviest burden. The affirmation in faith of the paradox of Christianity and 
the affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same both serve to establish 
the highest possible tension in man, the tension between the finite and the 
infinite, between the temporal and the eternal.
Let us examine the matter more closely. The criterion of inwardness is not 
objective truth -  indeed, quite the contrary. Objective uncertainty is a necessary 
condition of truth as subjectivity for Kierkegaard. The criterion of inwardness 
is rather the degree of tension, the degree to which the passion of the infinite 
is present in a finite being. However, this was also the case for the existential 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. Indeed, even in its cosmic 
formulation, it was not presented as objectively certain, but rather as some­
thing the individual imposed upon the chaos of existence through his will to 
power as interpretation. The individual gives an eternal confirmation and seal 
to each moment; indeed, the highest expression of the will to power is the 
imposition of the character of being on the world of becoming.54 Just as the 
paradox of Christianity is not to be judged in terms of its objective truth for 
Kierkegaard, so, too, eternal recurrence of the same is not for Nietzsche to 
be judged in term of its objective truth. In regard to both doctrines, their 
essential truth is the truth of inwardness.
Given inwardness as the criterion of the truth of the eternal recurrence 
of the same, one could argue in a Kierkegaardian mode that Nietzsche lost 
sight of his own insight when he attempted to “prove” the doctrine, for such 
an attempt signals a turning away from the doctrine: an increase in inward­
ness. Moreover, any attempt to draw conclusions from the doctrine which 
have some claim to objective validity -  if indeed that is even possible within 
Nietzsche’s framework -  would involve a misunderstanding of the doctrine. 
It cannot function as a supreme principle from which conclusions can be
53 Ibid., p. 123.
54 Werke, V III/1, 7 (5 4 ), p. 320  =  The W ill to Power, § 617 , p. 330.
drawn, for it does not claim to objective validity, that is, it is not meant as 
an assertion about objects. Insofar as the cosmic doctrine of the eternal re­
currence of the same is interpreted as an assertion about objects, then it is 
to be verified by looking at those objects; this in turn involves a turning away 
from the self and a decrease in the tension it was originally intended as an 
existential doctrine to establish. It then becomes a fable of madness in Kierke­
gaard’s sense as an attempt to embrace some sort of objectivity with the passion 
of the infinite.55
A far more serious objection could be raised to the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence from a Kierkegaardian standpoint: not only is it madness to 
embrace some kind of objectivity with the passion of the infinite, but one 
must embrace only the infinite and the absolute with this kind of passion. 
Such passion can only be directed toward an infinite and absolute object, i. e. 
God. To do anything less than this is contradictory, for only an absolute and 
infinite subject is worthy of such passion. With this, howewer, we reach the 
most fundamental point of divergence between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. 
For Nietzsche, the affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same is an 
affirmation of man as the infinite and absolute subject. Thus the death of 
God opens up the possibility of an “open sea” for man.
Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news 
that “the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart over­
flows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last 
the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at 
long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; 
all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our 
sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open 
sea.” - 56
The affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same is in this sense a relation 
an infinite and absolute object, but this subject is not the Kierkegaardian God 
but rather the possibilities contained in man. This is for Nietzsche an af­
firmation which is made -  as is the Kierkegaardian leap of faith -  in the 
face of objective uncertainty, but made with the next cheerfulness of the free 
spirit rather than the fear and trembling of the religious man.
55 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 1 7 4
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.. .  one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, 
such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and 
every wish for certainty, being practized in maintaining himself on insub­
stantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit 
would be the free spirit par excellence.57 
This is both the subject and object of the absolute affirmation of the eternal 
recurrence of the same in Nietzsches philosophy: the free spirit par excellence, 
the overcoming of man as he merely is, the emergence of the Übermensch as 
the overcoming of man.
Conclusion
To what point have we been brought in this rather tortuous investigation 
into Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same? We began 
with Zarathustra’s statement of the problem: is it possible to affirm all of 
existence, to transform even the past, the “it was,” into a “thus I willed it?” 
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same emerged as Nietzsche’s 
attempt to say “yes” to all of existence. On the existential level the doctrine 
presented itself as a question that was intended to put man in the highest 
state of tension by imposing upon him the greatest burden, the burden of 
affirming all of existence. This involved the cosmic doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence of all events, and there was some evidence to suggest that Nietzsche 
thought the doctrine could be demonstrated as necessary on this level. How­
ever, given Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as meaning and inter­
pretation, such attempts at proof must be viewed as attempts to create rather 
than discover meaning, as exercises of the individual’s will to power as inter­
pretation.
The Kierkegaardian critique then centered on the problem of temporality 
and the affirmation of self and world. It was argued that the moment could 
never be affirmed in isolation without a destruction of both self and world 
and that the rotation method of the aesthetic man, which does indeed bring 
about an eternal recurrence of the same in one sense, destroyed the continuity 
of both self and world. Thus it was shown that the eternal recurrence of the 
same cannot be willed purely on the aesthetic level through the rotation
57 Ibid., p. 265 =  ibid., V  § 347, pp. 2 8 9 -9 0 .
method. It was then shown that the continuity necessary for the constitution 
of self and world could be achieved through the resolute self-choice of the 
ethical man, but this self-choice necessarily posited a distance between self 
and world by drawing a distinction between that which I have willed and 
that which I have willed and that which I have not willed. Such a distinction, 
hovewer, precludes the possibility of affirming all of existence as a “thus I 
willed it;” consequently, it precludes the possibility of affirming the eternal 
recurrence of the same. We were then left with the problem that the eternal 
recurrence of the same seemed to be incompatible with an affirmation of the 
distinction between self and world, for the affirmation of the eternal re­
currence of the same seemed to destroy any meaningful distinction between 
self and world.
In turning to a consideration of religious existence, we then saw that there 
was a fundamental similarity between the paradox of faith in Kierkegaard's 
position and the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same in Nietzsches 
philosophy. Both place the greatest burden on human existence in order to 
bring about the greatest possible increase in the passion of inwardness. Neither 
lay claim to objective truth, but rather hold firm to their objective uncertainty 
in order to heighten the tension which is indeed their truth. However, whereas 
Kierkegaard’s position involved an absolute relation of the individual to God, 
Nietzsche’s standpoint is intended to bring the individual into an absolute 
relation to man in his infinite possibilities.
However, as the Kierkegaardian critique has shown, the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same can never have objective validity. Indeed, its 
objective uncertainty must always be kept clearly in mind. The failure to 
do so leads inevitably either to the dissolution of both self and world into 
a series of discrete moments as shown in our consideration of aesthetic 
existence or to the conflation of self and world which we discussed in relation 
to ethical existence. In the final analysis, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
of the same cannot be a doctrine at all; it can only be an existential question -  
the question of whether the individual is willing to affirm man and all his 
possibilities absolutely as man’s alone. The affirmation can never be complete, 
however, for the “answer” to the question is the existential task of living out 
that affirmation in the face of an objective uncertainty, an affirmation in 
which the individual maintains himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities, 
giving up all faith and every wish for certainty, dancing even near abysses.
Such an individual is Nietzsches free spirit, playing naively beyond good 
and evil.
Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal 
to which we should not wish to persuade anybody because we do not readily 
concede the right to it to anonyme: the ideal of a spirit who plays naively -  
that is, not deliberately, but from overflowing power and abundance -  with 
all that which hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for whom 
those supreme things that the people naturally accept as their value 
standards, signify danger, decay, debasement, or at least recreation, blind­
ness, and temporary self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman well­
being and benevolence that will often appear inhuman — for example, 
when it confronts all earthly seriousness so far, all solemnity in gesture, 
word, tone, eye, morality, and task so far, as if it were their most incarnate 
and involuntary parody -  and in spite of all this, it is perhaps only with 
him that great seriousness really begins, that the real question mark is 
posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul changes, the hand 
moves forward, the tragedy begins,58
58 Ibid., pp. 3 1 8 -1 9  =  ibid., V . § 3 8 2 , p. 347.
